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CONFESSION AND AVOIDANCE?

-

REFLECTIONS

ON REREADING JUDGE FRANK'S
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND*

T

HE late Mr. Justice Holmes once remarked in a letter
to Sir Frederick Pollock, "all books are dead in twentyfive years, but luckily the public does not find it out." Judge
Frank's Law and the Modern Mind was first published in
1930. Justice Holmes' literary statute of limitations has thus
not yet run against it. A sixth printing is now issued. The
1930 text remains exactly the same. The author, however,
"confesses" in a new preface specially written for the reprint,
that he would not today write the book "precisely" as he did
eighteen years ago. At the end of the preface he adds a list
of three books and eighteen articles written by him since
1931. To these the reader is sent "if he has any questions
about the ideas expressed" in Law and the Modern Mind.
Few lawyers and fewer laymen will have ready access to
all of Judge Frank's post-Law and the Modern Mind writings, or the opportunity to compare them carefully with the
unrevised text of the present reprint to determine the "precise" extent to which the author's philosophy of law has undergone material alteration, if any. Those, however, who
pursue the course of collateral reading recommended by
*LAw ANTHE MoDN MNE. By Jerome Frank. Sixth Pxinting. New York:
Coward-McCann, Inc., 1949. Preface by the author, pp. xxvii, text pp. 362. $5.00.
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Judge Frank and then reread the text, may well conclude
that it is time to re-write rather than reprint Law and the
Modern Mind. Some may think that the author is in fact
now adding his note to the Swan Song of Legal Realism.1
For the preface of the sixth printing is replete with caveats,
disclaimers, limitations and qualifications. Judge Frank regrets that he attempted another definition of "law" and thus
involved himself in fruitless controversies with other "law
definers." He wishes it had been more clearly understood
that he intended to "talk of actual past decisions or guesses
about future decisions, of specific lawsuits." It was a "blunder" to have used the term "legal realism" at all, since there
was no "homogeneous" school of legal realism, and since the
word "realism" had philosophical connotations which have
no connection with the work of "legal realists." Hence the
way was opened f&: his critics to ascribe to him views perhaps entertained by some "legal realists," but by no means
fairly descriptive of the thinking of all legal realists, to say
nothing of the author -himself. Moreover he was mainly concerned with -the judicial process in the trial courts and with
the problem of uncertainty and unpredictability in our present trial court methods in fact determinations.
Judge Frank now admits -that his comments on Aristotle
were "glib" and that his references to "scholasticism" were
"superficial and unfair." He reminds us that he has since
made "amends and apologies" elsewhere. "Roman Catholics"
misunderstood him if they thought he intended to criticize
the "Natural Law" doctrine. The book "contains no mention
of Natural Law." Indeed, in a sweeping sentence, in the new
preface, Judge Frank says that he cannot understand "how
any decent man can today refuse to adopt, as the basis of
modern civilization the fundamental principles of Natural
Law, relative to human conduct, as stated by Thomas Aquinas." Nevertheless, the "Natural Law" "furnishes no helpI Aronson, Book Review, 20 TEx. L. Rrx. 118 (1941).
The Swan-Song of Legal Realism.
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ful standard for evaluating the fact-determinations of trial
courts in most lawsuits, and no assistance in ensuring uniformity, certainty or predictability in such determinations."
Writers on "Natural Law" have not yet faced this problem.
Judge Frank's elaborate psychoanalytical apparatus reconstructed from the work of Piaget and Freud, as an explanation of the "persistent longing of lawyers and non-lawyers for a patently unachievable legal stability" remains intact in the reprint. In his preface the author warns the reader that he repeatedly stated that the explanation was offered only as a "partial" one, and that he had in fact enumerated fourteen other "partial" explanations. His criticsfor example, the late Dean Walter B. Kennedy 2 -were
wrong in accusing him of resorting to "Freudian complexes"
in explaining the demand for certainty in the law. It was
likewise error to charge him with "abject devotion" to psychology as an "authoritarian science," for to Judge Frank,
psychology is not a "science" but an "art" and even so "still
in its infancy." He is not a "devotee of behaviorism." Nor
is he a "psychological determinist." All this, we are told,
he has made abundantly clear in his other writings, and he
points out .that even in Law and the Modern Mind 'he had
occasion to criticize adversely at -leastone important feature
of behaviorism. He was surprised, therefore, when some of
his critics accused him of "anti-rationalism" and "anti-idealism."
When Law and the Modern Mind was first issued in 1930,
traditionalists were shocked and realists enthusiastic. Llewellyn thought the book was "keen, cogent and well-integrated." Adler found it contained "very little argument" and
"such as there is misses the point entirely or confuses rather
than clarifies the issue between realism and fundamentalism
2Kennedy, Functiona Nonsense and the Transcendental Approach, 5 Foan.
L. Rzv. 272 (1936); and by the same author, Realism, What Next? 7 Foam. L. Rzy.
203 (1938).
3 Llewellyn, Adler and Cook, Law and the Modern Mind: A Symposium, 31
CoL. L. Rxy. 82 (1931).
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in jurisprudence." 4 Allen wrote caustically about "Jazz Jurisprudence," and referred to some of Judge Frank's remarks
on precedent as a "fantastic distortion of the nature of judicial logic and discipline."' Only a new edition and not a reprint of Law and the Modern Mind, incorporating the qualifications of the present preface and the results of the author's later thinking can tell whether the traditionalist's sense
of shock will be lessened or the realist's ardent enthusiasm
dampened by Judge Frank's present position. Until then
further misunderstanding is almost inevitable.
Rereading the text now in the light of the new preface
alone, it would seem that large portions of Law and the Mode z Mind have undergone considerable "disinflation." For
instance, in the reprinted text,6 Judge Frank states that "on
the continent there is a movement in favor of 'free legal decision' which emphasizes the subjective sense of justice inherent in the judge. The question is not whether we shall
adopt 'free legal decision' but whether we shall admit that
we already have it." In his new preface the author says "no
sane informed person will deny that within appropriate limits, judicial adherence to precedents possesses such great value that to abandon it would be unthinkable." Does Judge
Frank still believe that "free legal decision" is a desideratum
to be eagerly pursued by us? Is it with him now a fait accomp? In his preface he quotes from an opinion written by
him after donning the robe of a judge: "courts should be
exceedingly cautious in disturbing-at least retrospectively
-precedents in reliance on which men have importantly
changed their positions." 7 Are we then to forget the text of
the reprint here and read only -the n~w preface as correctly
stating Judge Frank's present position? Or shall we wait
patiently for a new edition of Law and the Modern Mind
4 Id. at 91.
5

AL LEN, LAW N THE MAXING 49, 248 (3rd ed. 1939).

6
7

LAw AND THE MODERN MInD 54, note.
Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B. G. Corp., 130 F. (2d) 290, 296 (C. C. A. 2nd

1942).
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wherein the author will show the appropriate limits of "free
decision" and "stare decisis,"-the boundaries of the areas
wherein adherence to precedent is, and wherein it is not, of
compelling importance? Such clarification is certainly due
those who now reread the unrevised chapter of Law and the
Modern Mind on "Dean Roscoe Pound and the Search for
Legal Certainty," " wherein the illustrious Dean is taken to
task for "partitioning" the field of legal order between cases
relating to "property and business transactions" and those
raising problems of "human conduct," and stressing the supreme value of stare decisis in the former inthe name of"certainty" and "predictability." What sort of "partitioning"
would Judge Frank now make? Quite obviously, a proper
chapter in a new edition of Law and the Modern Mind could
be entitled "Dean Pound Revisited." Such a chapter might
well show the points at which the realist's "judicial" justice
achieves juristic rapprochement with the "rule" justice which
the author's present prefatory acknowledgment of the value
of stare decisis apparently approves, at lease within appropriate limits.
If, as Judge Frank reminds us now in his preface, "realists" aim at more "judicial justice," and if the method of
"free legal decision" is to be accepted, it may be well to recall the words of Professor Dickinson written some time after the first publication of Law and the Modern Mind:9
...
some of the proponents of newer theories of jurisprudence seem to avoid stability by substituting the idea of government by "flexible intelligence" for government in accord
with rules of law. Their hostility to rules arises precisely from
the element of stability which rules necessarily involve, and
they, therefore, seek to eliminate the rule-element in law in
favor of a conception of law consisting essentially of intelligent
discretion. From this standpoint, law is whatever government
does in the exercise of a supposedly intelligent discretion.
Hence the desire to have government operate as much as possible through discretionary administrative agencies of experts

8 LAw AND THE MOID

MuN, Part II, Ch. I.
Dickinson, in My PmxosorxY or LAw (Rosenwald Foundation, for General Law ed., 1941).
9
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and the insistence that the discretion of these agencies shall
be free from review by courts of law. This view stripped of
its contemporary phraseology and modernistic trappings, is
nothing but a return to the age-old idea that the best govern-

ment is governed by philosopher-kings. This idea long ago lost
out in the competition of the market-place to the more pedestrian idea of government by law, because law, although at the
expense of a certain amount of flexibility, can at least institu-

tionalize the common sense wisdom of mankind, while the wisdom of the philosopher-king can often be proved to be wisdom only by the persuasive force of bullets and bombs. Whether the wisdom of modem philosopher-kings can be made to rest

on any different kind of proof remains to be seen.

What assurance can the realists give us that their quest for
more "judicial" justice, perhaps through the method of "free
legal decision"-a quest deemed more worthy than that for
"certainty"--will not produce results quite like those suggested by Dickinson? After all we may remember that Walter Wheeler Cook, who frankly avowed his allegiance to
"realism" in jurisprudence, once said that "having given up
the quest for certainty, we have no guarantees to offer."1"
Many, like the present writer who first read Law and the
Modern Mind in 1930, felt that Judge Frank's assault on the
demand for "certainty" in law-the "basic myth" (to use the
author's language)-was more exuberant than his real purpose demanded. The baby was thrown out with the bath
water. Does the present by implication suggest that the baby
might now well be brought back? If so, Law and the Modern Mind can hardly avoid being misunderstood once more.
It cannot be saved by a reprint at war with a preface.
Further disinflation of the author's apparent purpose appears in the present prefatory discussion of the alleged
"school" of realistic jurisprudence. Unsuspecting average
readers as well as eminent legal critics could scarcely be
blamed for concluding from the first edition of Law and the
Modern Mind that the author at least did not intend to disparage "legal realism." As Adler said,1 the book
10 Id. at 64.
11 Llewellyn, Adler and Cook, op. cit. supra note 3, at 92.
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..
can be taken as representative of the school of legal
thought which has raised much dust in jurisprudential
controversy in this country in the last twenty-five years. In
criticizing Law and the Modern Mind one criticizes the posi*

tions of Cook, Oliphant, Bingham, Yntema, Green, Wurzel,
and to a lesser extent, Pound, Cardozo, and Holmes.

In the present preface, Judge Frank tells us that it is a mistake 'to assume that there is a "homogeneous school" of legal realism. Now while it may be true, as Morris Cohen puts
it, that a "philosophic label" is often a "libel," and while as
yet the legal realists have not applied for corporation papers,
nevertheless there was and still is an attitude of pragmatism
and empiricism fairly common to all legal realists. It may
be, as Adler remarked, a "raw" pragmatism and empiricism,
less "raw" in some than in others. It may be also that the
great fountain-head of contemporary "legal realism" is John
Dewey's Quest for Certainty. Judge Frank tells us -that"legal realists" are roughly divided into -two groups. There are
"Rule Skeptics" and "Fact Skeptics." From the former,
Judge Frank disengages himself. He is a "Fact Skeptic."
The "Rule Skeptics" to him, by their undue concentration
on the work of appellate courts and by their endeavors
to find -the "real rules" behind the "paper rules" as more reliable instruments of prediction, dwell in a "two dimensional world." "Fact Skeptics" are more closely concerned with
the fact-finding process in the trial courts. They are wary
of the "Myth of the Upper Court." 12 They dwell in a "three
dimensional world."
The reader of the first edition of Law and the Modern
Mind was scarcely prepared for this new classification of legal realists. The author did indeed devote considerable attention to the "basic myth" as it appeared in the workings of
the trial courts. This however did not clearly appear to be
his only or even his primary concern. If now warned by his
preface that we are to take the reprinted text as intended
12

(1949).

Frank, Cardozo and the Upper Court Myth, 13 L. & CoNTEz.. PNoB. 369
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mainly to deal with the problem of "certainty" vs. "uncertainty" in the trial court process, it can at least be said that
the general attack on the "myth" of certainty in the legal
field seems too broad. Those of us who have tried cases to
juries or to the court alone surely learned early enough not to
guarantee the outcome to clients when the facts were in dispute and the witnesses contradicting each other with mistaken or intentionally distorted versions of events perhaps
already long past at trial time. Granted that we need extensive reform in our methods of fact finding in the trial
courts, and granting that students of psychology (though
not a "science" but merely an "art"-to use Judge Frank's
characterization) may have much to teach us, does our inability to predict with certainty the ultimate verdict of a jury on
disputed testimony warrant a general repudiation of "certainty" in law as a "childish" myth foolishly cultivated by
lawyers and judges to appease the equally "childish" demand
of the layman seeking a "substitute" to fill the void of the
long exploded "absolutes" of his childhood-a "certainty"
which the law can never give in any sense? Truly, "until
men are angels" we will not have angels in the jury box nor
archangels on the bench. In the long meantime, are we to
abandon as a vain effort sure to result in the frustration or
deception of the layman, the quest for "certainty" in lawin "human" not "angelic" justice through impersonalized
rules of law? Are we to renounce even as an ideal (assuming
that "realists" whether of -the "Fact Skeptic" or the "Rule
Skeptic" divisions, respectively, will leave us some of our
ideals) "government by law" in favor of "government by
men" still sadly "less than angels"? Law and the Moden
Mind was written in 1930. Three years later Adolf Hitler
became Chancellor of the German Reich and the world for
fifteen years was witness again to a brutally "real" manifestation of personalized justice and personalized law. And now
the "realist" champion Cook tells us that "having given
up the quest for certainty we have no guarantees to offer."
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Is this judge Frank's position now? If not, what are his
"guarantees"? Is the only "certainty" simply that there are
no "certainties"? In a world "grown gray at the breath" of
personalized "justice," what have the "realists," whether
of the "Right" or of the "Left," to offer? Such questions
are provoked fairly by a rereading of Law and the Modern
Mind after eighteen years, when one has "called in aid" the
new preface and the author's other writings. In spite of prefatory disclaimers, it seems that Judge Frank is not content
to limit his inquiries into legal philosophy to the narrower
field of "juriesprudence," as he calls it.'He is led forever onward like all who grasp the seamless garment of Jurisprudence to formulate a general philosophy of law. One who ventures into Jurisprudence even through the medium of "juriesprudence" can never return until he has faced and answered the far, far deeper questions that lie beyond the behavior of an Anglo-American trial judge or trial jury. Some
questions and some answers appeared in the first edition of
Law and the Modern Mind. The preface to its reprinting
now shows that author not "precisely" satisfied. He has
evoked newer and more fundamental questions.- The answers will require more than a reprinting of an old text
with a new preface.
Of course in the reprint, the author's "Freudian" analysis
of the layman's demand for certainty in the law remains unaltered. The preface merely warns us that it was offered
only as a "partial" explanation. The present writer is but a
"mere lawyer," not a psychoanalyst, psychologist or (be it
added in haste) an embryologist. He must therefore leave to
others more qualified than he the interesting question whether the origin of the human quest for certainty lies in the
striving of the human being vainly to re-acquire the prenatal security he enjoyed as an embryo in his mother's womb.
The same must be said about the author's borrowings from
Piaget and others to the effect that the layman's "childish"
expectation of "certainty" in the law is but a. "transfer"
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made when "Life with Father" revealed all too soon to the
child that father is not infallible and when other "father
substitutes" proved also to be but broken reeds. Judge
Frank has left these and other explanations intact in his reprinted text of 1930. It is thus still open to the criticism
made by others eighteen years ago - that Piaget's findings
and conclusions have not escaped serious questioning that Judge Frank has reasserted them with a dogmatism
he is too ready to chastise when he thinks he has found it
in others. (The rather "emotive" attack on Beale and
Bealism " is in point here). Sometimes we are never so
dogmatic as when we attack dogmas with which we disagree. Suffice to say that the present preface does little to
allay the misgivings of the reader of Law and the Modern
Mind in 1949. Disclaimers of "behaviorism" and of "psychological determinism" may not be enough.
Not only "Roman Catholics" (who contrary to the prevalent impression have not acquired a non-assignable, nontransferable -interest in Natural Law) but many others not
of Roman Catholic persuasion will be interested in Judge
Frank's prefatory amende honorable to "Scholasticism" and
"Natural Law." What effect does it really have on the unrevised text of Law and the Modem Mind? How much for
instance, of the chapter on "Verbalism and Scholasticism"' 4
is to remain intact in the light of the author's generous disavowal of his former views? Are we merely to forgive Judge
Frank's unpardonably careless use of "Dark Ages" which,
in the manner of a school of historians we had long thought
extinct, he uses interchangeably with "Middle Ages"? Are
we merely to excise from the reprinted text the implications
of pitying contempt in his use of the terms "Scholastic" and
"Medieval"? Or, is something far deeper intended? In his
text Judge Frank says that "Scholasticism worshipped the
1
14

LAW, AND TE MODERN MIND, Part I, Ch. VI.
Id. Part I, Ch. VII.
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word."15 "It established a hierarchy of ideas in which what
is most void of content is placed highest." 1 This strange
concept of Scholastic epistemology and ontology is almost
of a piece with that of men who once dismissed them as offering nothing more than silly controversies over how many
angels could dance on the point of a pin. Judge Frank gives
no indication that he has deeply delved into the history of
the conflict between the Nominalists and the Realists in
Medieval Philosophy. He seems to have conjured up a picture of Platonic Idealism and then passed his version on
through Aristotle to the Scholastics. Perhaps it is unfair now
to make these strictures in view of the "apologies" which
Judge Frank reminds us he has made "elsewhere." Still -the
question remains-how does the author's present view of
Scholasticism affect his Chapter VII, which perforce remains
intact in this reprinting, exactly as it was written in 1930?
How much of the apparent thesis of Law and the Modern
Mind rested upon the author's views of Scholasticism? How
much is now gone out of it in view of the apparent change of
views on Scholasticism?
"There is no mention of Natural Law in the book" says
Judge Frank in his preface. However, in the course of his
frontal attack on Bealism, mainly because of its claim of a
superhuman character for law, the author quotes " (and
certainly not with approval) Blackstone's famous statement
regarding the "Natural Law": "The law of nature... is binding over all the globe in all countries and at all times; no
human laws are of any validity if contrary to this; and such
of them as are valid derive all their authority mediately or
immediately from this original." Judge Frank then proceeds
to point his batteries at those who, like Blackstone and Beale
place law on an "extra-experiential" basis. Against them he
cites with praise, the famous Holmesian half-truth that "law
is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky."
15
16

Id at 64.
Ibid.

17

LAW AwD TE MODERN MIND 54.
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In his preface Judge Frank now tells us that he certainly
did not intend to criticize adversely the Thomistic version of
the Natural Law. St. Thomas in a passage which one may
venture to assert Blackstone had read carefully, said "every
human law has just so much of the nature of law as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects
from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion
of law." I Precisely what is it in Blackstone's passage which
Judge Frank disparages that does not appear with equal clarity in the quotation from St. Thomas? Furthermore, when
one reads St. Thomas' discussion of the relations between
the "Natural Law" and the "Eternal Law," " it would seem
that for St. Thomas too, law had an "extra-experiential" basis. What then does Judge Frank mean, taking his preface

and his text together, by his accolade to the Thomistic Natural Law?
Of course, Judge Frank tells us that the Thomistic Natural Law offers "no helpful standards for evaluating the factdeterminations of trial courts in most lawsuits and no assistance in ensuring uniformity, certainty or predictability in

such determinations."

One wonders whether judge Frank

fully appreciates the meaning of St. Thomas' treatise on law.

St. Thomas was certainly not writing a treatise on AngloAmerican jury trials. If Judge Frank intended, as he now
tells us, to deal primarily with the judicial process in trial
courts in Law and the Modern Mind, and was not principally
concerned at all with the broader problems of the philosophy
of law, why acclaim Thomistic Natural Law in the present
preface? The fact is that the reader, in spite of the preface,
when he reads or rereads the text will get the reasonably clear
impression that the author in whole chapters of the book was
exploring the field of Jurisprudence generally. If such an
impression is correct, then the author's present concession of
value to the Thomistic Natural Law has a deeper and more
18
19

Tmoms AQumAS, Sumw
Id. Q 93, art. 3.

THEOLOGICA, I, ii Q 95, art. 2.
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extensive impact on the book than the author apparently
realizes at present. The Thomistic Natural Law doctrine is
not something which can be wrenched out of -the marvelously
concatenated scheme of the Summa Theologica of which it is
an integral part. It does not stand "in vacuo." Will not its
acceptance by the author bring with it other "acceptances"
quite inconsistent with, if not wholly fatal to entire sections
of Law and the Modern Mind? For example, how does
Judge Frank's present benediction of the Natural Law of St.
Thomas fit into his laudation of Justice Holmes as his "completely adult jurist" 20 who "put away the childish longings
for a father-controlled world," the hero for whom the "golden
rule" was "that there is no golden rule"? Surely Judge
Frank is well aware of the half-humorous, half-contemptuous
dismissal of the Natural Law doctrine by Justice Holmes.
After reading the preface of the present reprint and the unrevised chapter on Justice Holmes with which the book
closes, one is tempted to ask "Under which King"?
When we have a new edition of Law and the Modern
Mind, the dilemma thus evoked should make an exciting
chapter. For the present, it must be said that the "preface
acceptance" of the Thomistic Natural Law placed against the
unaltered text creates a series of problems which have not
yet been answered by the author. Far-reaching are the implications involved in an acceptance of the Thomistic Natural Law. Judge Frank with great courage and with unquestioned sincerity of purpose is striving to bring more justice into law. Will he now be led to a more solid and more
satisfying synthesis than that deriving from pragmatism and
empiricism, which, though decrying all absolutes as "childish," and though professing to have "no guarantees to offer,"
yet give us their own strange Absolute - the "Non-Absolute"? One can only wait and see.
Edward F. Barrett
20 LAw Aim THE MoDERN Mnw, Part II, Ch. III.

